AES is a block cipher specified in NIST FIPS 197 with 128-, 192- and 256-bit keys; AES-256 uses the 256-bit key. The name tells you which algorithm protects data, not whether a product protects your data well. That depends on what is encrypted, the mode used, and who holds the key.
What AES-256 actually is
AES transforms 128-bit blocks of data (16 bytes) using a secret key. FIPS 197 defines three key lengths; the suffix in AES-128, AES-192 or AES-256 is the key size in bits. On its own, AES encrypts one block. Real systems wrap it in a mode of operation, such as GCM, which NIST SP 800-38D specifies for authenticated encryption: it hides content and detects tampering.
Why GCM needs more than a secret key
GCM uses an authentication tag to check whether protected data was altered. A failed check must be treated as a failure, not as a usable photo. It also needs a nonce, or initialization value, that is not reused with the same key. Reuse can undermine confidentiality and authentication even when the key is 256 bits long.
An app’s documentation should explain how it handles these requirements. A cipher name or a “military-grade” badge does not establish that the implementation meets them.
Three questions that matter more than the number
- What is encrypted: every photo and video, or only an index, thumbnails or a database?
- Where does the key come from: your password, your device, a server, or a constant shipped inside the app?
- Who can obtain that key: only you, the company, or anyone who studies a copy of the app?
A practical example
Two apps both say “AES-256”. App A encrypts each photo with a key derived from your passphrase on the device. App B encrypts only its file list with a key that is identical in every installation. Both statements are true, but an attacker with a copy of App B’s files and the app can read the list and the photos. The cipher is the same; the design is not.
A password-derived key also depends on the strength of the password and how guesses are slowed down. A short, predictable password does not become a random 256-bit secret merely because the resulting key is 256 bits long. This is different from an app that generates a random encryption key and uses a password only to control access.
How this applies to Photo Vault
New and successfully migrated Photo Vault media archives use AES-256-GCM with per-file keys protected by a random installation key in this device’s Keychain. The app password or pattern controls access separately; final build verification is pending. Current index writes use AES-GCM under the installation key. Older formats are read for migration; older archives need successful migration before the new protection applies.
Separately, iOS encrypts the device’s storage with Data Protection. That protection comes from the operating system and your passcode, not from Photo Vault.
Reading any app’s claim
- Look for a description of what is encrypted and with which key, not just a cipher name.
- Prefer documentation that explains key derivation and recovery.
- Treat independent review as stronger evidence than a badge on a website.
- Ask what happens to readable previews, temporary files and exported copies while the app is in use; storage encryption is not a promise that every copy remains encrypted.
Sources & further reading
- NIST FIPS 197: Advanced Encryption Standard
- NIST SP 800-38D: Galois/Counter Mode (PDF)
- Apple Developer: CryptoKit AES.GCM